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We employ newly developed split hazard modeling to estimate the conditional probability 
that a firm will eventually return to public status following a leveraged buyout (LBO),  and the 
conditional probability of reversion to  public status  in a given year for a firm  that eventually 
may reverse.  Our results, based on 343 LBO transactions, imply that not all LBO firms expect 
eventual  reversion  to  public  status.  In  addition,  we find  that those  LBO  decisions  that  are 
expected  to  enhance value the  most are less  likely  to  reverse eventually.  We also  find  that 
eventual  reversal  probabilities  and  the  timing  of  reversals  for  divisional  LBOs  are  not 
significantly different from full-firm LBOs. PREDICI7NG mE  DURATION OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
We employ modem developments in hazard rate modeling to predict the probability that 
a firm will eventually return to  public ownership following a leveraged buyout (LBO),  and  to 
predict the conditional probability of reversal in a given year for  a firm  that eventually  may 
reverse its LBO.  Our findings  may  shed  some light on the economic underpinnings of LBO 
reversals, and ipso facto, the economic motivation behind the controversial LBO decision itself. 
Of particular interest is our finding that not all LBOs are expected to reverse in the long run, 
a finding  that is  made possible by the choice of split hazard  model estimation (introduced by 
Schmidt  and  Witte  1989).  The  conditional  probability  of reversal  in  subsequent  periods 
increases with the passage of time since the buyout, and management buyouts (MBOs) reverse 
less quickly than other LBOs.  An LBO transaction that is expected to enhance value the most, 
as measured by the stock price reaction to the announcement, is less likely to reverse eventually, 
and will reverse less quickly.  We also find that the eventual reversal probabilities and the timing 
of reversals for divisional LBOs are not significantly different from full-firm LBOs. 
Our study  adds  to  the  rapidly  growing  literature on  LBOs  in  particular and  financial 
restructuring  in  general.  Prior  studies  have  examined  advantages  and  limitations of LBOs 
(Jensen  1986,  1989,  Kaplan  1989b,  Rappaport  1990),  factors  that induce  firms  to  undertake 2 
LBOs (Lehn and Poulsen 1989, Opler and Titman 1993), wealth effects of LBO decisions,l and 
post-buyout operating performance.  2  Most of the work on reverse LBOs has focused on post-
IPO stock and operating performance (e.g., Degeorge and  Zeckhauser  1993,  Holthausen and 
Larcker 1993, and Mohan 1990).  The studies that have examined the likelihood and timing of 
the reverse LBO decision include Degeorge and  Zeckhauser  (1993), Holthausen and  Larcker 
(1993), and Kaplan (1991).  Our study exploits a more complete information set on the timing 
of the reversal,  as will be described below.  Moreover,  the adopted split hazard model allows 
us to assess in a nonparametric way the impact of the passage of time on a firm's conditional 
reversal probability,  and it accounts for heterogeneity in reversal  probabilities; i.e., it is  not 
assumed that all firms have the same probability of eventual reversal. 
In Section II,  we frame our tests  by appealing to  various  strands of economic theory 
pertinent to the LBO decision including (1) agency cost control (e.g., Jensen 1986,  1989 and 
Rappaport  1990);  (2)  efficient  risk-bearing  (e.g.,  Kaplan  1991);  (3)  efficient  resource 
management (e.g., Fama and Jensen 1983, Hite and Vetsuypens  1989, and Kaplan 1991), and 
(4) information asymmetry (Kaplan 1991).  The split hazard model is described and estimated 
in Section III, and we summarize and conclude in Section IV. 
lSee Asquith and Wizman (1990), Cook, Easterwood and Martin (1992), DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice (1984), 
Harlow and Howe (1993),  Hite and Vetsuypens (1989), Ippolito and James (1992), Kaplan (1989a), Kaplan and 
Stein (1990), Lowenstein (1985), Marais, Schipper and Smith 11989), Newbould, Chatfield and Anderson (1992), 
Shleifer and Summers (1988), and Smith (1990). 
2See  Kaplan (1989a), Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), and Smith (1990). 3 
II.  mEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND SAMPLE DESIGN 
A.  The Duration of LBOs 
Management ownership concentration reduces the stockholder-manager agency conflict 
(Jensen  and  Meckling  1976),  hence  Jensen  (1986,  1989)  argues  that  LBOs  are  superior  to 
publicly held firms and should remain private for an unspecified, but significant amount of time. 
Rappaport  (1990)  argues,  on  the  other hand,  that  leveraged  going-private transactions  offer 
reduced agency costs and improved operating efficiency through one-time changes.  Once these 
changes  are effected,  the  leverage  poses  a  net  disadvantage  through  reduced  flexibility  and 
vulnerability to  financial distress.  Add  to  this  the desire for liquidity by LBO  investors and 
owner-managers,  and  a  strong  motive  emerges  for  eventual  reversion  to  public -ownership. 
Thus, a natural question is whether all LBO firms are expected to reverse eventually; i.e., what 
is  the probability of ultimately returning to public ownership?  A related but distinct question 
is,  for those firms that eventually may reverse,  what is the conditional probability of reversal 
in  a  given  year?  The  split  hazard  model  developed  in  the  next  section  enables  separate 
estimation of the probability of eventual reversal and the conditional probability of reversal in 
a given year. 
Regardless of whether all LBOs are expected eventually to reverse, longevity of  each may 
be due to firm-specific circumstances; i.e., the conditional probability of reversing in period t+ 1 
given private status through period t may vary according to observable characteristics.  Kaplan 
(1991) notes that costs associated with risk-bearing plus the need for liquidity by LBO investors 
increase with LBO  size,  hence large LBOs should have shorter duration. 4 
Divisional MBOs can lead to increases in efficiency in decision management and decision 
control  (Fama  and  Jensen  1983).  Hite  and  Vetsuypens  (1989)  explain  how  the  change  in 
ownership structure of a division can lead to improved resource allocation, and Kaplan (1991) 
argues that once the improvements have been realized,  the division is likely to be taken public 
the other hand, Kaplan (1991) argues that divisional managers are less likely to be able to exploit 
information asymmetries than  managers of full  firms  that are taken private.  Thus,  divisional 
MBOs are less likely to go public again and may have longer durations. 
The stock  market  reaction  to  LBO  announcements  can  provide  clues  as  to  expected 
duration.  Strong positive reactions should portend longer duration; i.e., firms that are expected 
to  benefit  most  from  private  status  should  remain  private  longer.  This  translates  into  later 
reversals for LBOs with strong positive announcement reactions, and may also indicate that some 
LBOs will never reverse. 
The  foregoing  discussion  serves  to  identify  several  observable  variables  that  may 
condition the probability of LBO reversal in a given period; i.e., the stock price reaction to the 
LBO announcement (measured by the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the announcement 
period), whether the LBO  is  for a division or a full  firm (FULL is an indicator variable equal 
to  I for full-firm buyouts and 0 otherwise); whether the buyout is management-led (MBO is an --
indicator variable equal to  1 for management-led buyouts and 0 otherwise), and the size of the 
LBO  (SIZE is the transaction value in  millions of dollars). 5 
B.  The Sample 
Our  initial  sample  consisted  of 483  LBO  transactions  completed  in  1980-1992  with 
transaction  size  of $100  million  or more  as  reported  by  Securities  Data  Corporation.  The 
following criteria resulted in  343 transactions: 
1.  LBO  firms  and  parent  firms  of LBO  divisions  have  stock  returns  in  the  Center  for 
Research  in  Security  Prices  (CRSP)  file  during  the  calendar  year  prior  to  the  LBO 
announcement. 
2.  Post-buyout  status  (public  v.  privately  held)  of  the  LBO  is  identifiable  either  in 
Newspaper  Abstracts  or  Ward's  Business  Directory  of u.s.  Private  and  Public 
Companies  (1994). 
Each LBO firm was classified as a completed or censored observation.  Following Kaplan 
(1991), we define a completed observation as one in which the LBO firm or division returns to 
public status  via an initial public offering (IPO) or upon acquisition by a publicly held  firm. 
Censored observations were those which were still private and  independent at the end of the 
observation period (October 31, 1993), were acquired by privately held firms, or had filed for 
bankruptcy. 
The sample is described in Table 1.  Of the full sample of 343 LBOs,  92 (26.8 percent) 
reversed by  IPO after 42.5 months on average,  and 31  (9  percent) were acquired by publicly 
held firms after about 46 months on average.  Censored observations included 166 (48.4 percent)--
that were still private at the end of the observation period (October 31, 1993),42 (12.2 percent) 
. 
that were bankrupt, and 12 (3.5 percent) that had been acquired by privately held firms.  Kaplan 
(1991)  examines  183  LBOs,  14 percent of which reverse by  lP~, 24  percent are acquired by 
publicly held firms, and 62 percent are still private at the end of the observation period.  Thus, 6 
our sample  is  similar  to  Kaplan's in  terms  of the proportion of censored  observations  (64.1 
percent  versus  his  62  percent),  but  differs  in  that  we  have  more  IPOs  and  fewer  public 
acquisitions. 
[Insert Table 1] 
The  median duration  for  completed  observations  is  43  months,  while the  median for 
censored observations is  62  months.  The average duration of our completed observations is 
roughly the same as  that reported by Kidder and Peabody (1988), Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
(1990), and Kaplan (1991). 
Of the 343 observations, 187 (54.5 percent) are full-firm LBOs (FULL = 1) and 156 (45.5 
percent)  are divisional (FULL=O).  MBOs  represent 54.8 perCent  (MBO= 1)  of the sample. 
The mean (median) SIZE of the LBO transactions is $542 million ($300 million), ranging from 
$100 million to $6.2 billion. 
c.  Valuation Effects of LBO Transactions 
In this section,  we confirm that the LBOs in our sample are viewed on average by the 
capital markets as positive events.  The announcement date (t=O) is taken as  the first date on 
which an LBO is mentioned in the press as recorded in Newspaper Abstracts.  Abnormal returns· --
are based on the market model with parameters estimated over the period t  =  -240 to t =  -39. 
Cumulative abnormal returns  (CAR), cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR), and test 
statistics (Z) are calculated identically to the method in Mikkelson and Partch (1988).  We omit 
observations for which 10 or more daily returns during the estimation period are missing. 7 
In  Table  2,  we  report  CAAR,  Z,  the  number  of positive  observations,  and  the 
significance level for the test for equal numbers of positive and negative CARs for various event 
windows.  In  Panel A of Table 2,  we  give  the  results  for  the  162  full-firm  LBOs  for  which 
sufficient data were  available,  and  in  Panel B we  report  results  for  parent firm  equity of 93 
divisional LBOs. 
[Insert Table 2] 
For full-firm  LBOs  (Panel  A),  the  CAAR  is  positive  (15.6%)  and  highly  significant 
(Z=55.53) for the event period (-1,  + 1),  and  this result holds over extended event periods as 
well.  For example,  for (-10,  +10), the  CAAR is  20.2%, and  highly significant (Z=26.61). 
For each of the four event periods considered the percentage of positive CARs exceeds 90, and 
is  highly  significant  in  all  cases  based  on  the  binomial  probability  distribution  with  equal 
probabilities of positive and negative CARs. 
As  expected,  the  results  are  less  pronounced  for  parent  firms  (Panel  B),  but  are 
nonetheless positive and significant at conventional levels.  For the event period (-1,  +  1),  the 
CAAR is 2.1 % (Z=4.599), and for (-10,  + 10), the CAAR is 2.6%  (Z=3.138).  For (-1, +  1), 
57%  of CARs  are positive (.0731  significance level),  and  for  (-10,  + 10),  61 % are positive 
(.0110 level). 
Our results are consistent with those in  prior studies.  For example, Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989) report a CAAR of 16.3%  for  the 3-day period around announcement (compare 15.6% 
in  our  study  for  the  period  (-1,  +  1)),  and  Kaplan  (1989)  reports  a  CAAR of 26%  (median 
value)  for the  lOO-day period beginning 40 days before announcement. 8 
ID.  MODEL DEVEWPMENT AND ESTIMATION 
A.  The Split Hazard Function 
We employ a hazard function h(t) to model the conditional probability that an LBO firm 
will reverse during period t,  given that it has  not done so as of period t - 1: 
h(t)  =  fit)  (1) 
1  - F(t) , 
where f(·) and F(·) are the respective probability density and cumulative distribution functions 
for t.  A standard hazard model such as that employed by Kaplan (1991) relies on the implicit 
assumption that all LBO firms eventually reverse, although h(t) may vary across firms according 
to values of a vector of explanatory variables X.  A split hazard function allows for LBO firms 
to fall into either of two categories, (1) those that eventually will reverse, and (2) those that will 
never reverse.  The split hazard  model we  develop below allows for heterogeneous  reversal 
probabilities across firms, and our extension includes a non parametric specification of the effect 
of time on firms'  reversal probabilities.3 
Define di as an indicator variable equal to  I if the LBO firm has not reversed (censored 
observation), and equal to 0 if it has  reversed.  Denote by  ~ the length of time that has lapsed  ~-
from the LBO transaction to either the observed reversal date or the censoring date.  Next define 
Ai as  an  unobservable  indicator variable equal to  I  if firm  i  is  an  LBO  that will eventually 
3Vanhuele,  Dekimpe, Sharma and Morrison (1994) employ a standard hazard model  modified to account for 
nonparametric  time  dependence  and unobserved heterogeneous  reversal  probabilities.  Our extension adds  their 
modifications to  the split hazard model of Schmidt and Witte (1989). 9 
reverse, and equal to 0 if the LBO will never reverse.  We express the likelihood of observing 
an LBO that has reversed in terms of the survival function Sl·), the additive inverse of Fi(·), 
the cumulative distribution function of ~: 
(2) 
In (2), the survival function Si( .) is conditioned on Ai  =  1;  i.e., Si(·) is the survival function 
for fIrms that eventually will reverse. 
Similarly, the likelihood of observing an LBO fIrm  with a  censored duration  (~ =  1) 
with time ~ having elapsed from the LBO transaction to the censoring date is given by 
Thus, for an arbitrary LBO firm i, the likelihood function is expressed as 
Lj(t)  = [oJSj(tj-1IAj=l)  - Sj(tj IAj=I)]r-d) 
x  [(I-oj)  +  0,si(tj-1IAj=l)t', 
(3) 
(4) 
where OJ  = P(Aj =  1), hence 1 - OJ  =  P(Aj =  0), the probability that the LBO fIrm will never 
reverse. 
Our next step is to recognize that the survival probability Sj(tJ  at any given time may 
depend on firm-specifIc characteristics Xj(t) as  well as the duration of the LBO up to period  ~. 
Following the usual procedure (Lancaster 1990; Tuma and Hannan 1984), we fIrst develop an 
expression for the reversal or hazard rate function ~(t), then use the unique relationship between 10 
Aj(t)  and Sj(t)  to derive the likelihood function. 4  Following Vanhuele, et al.  (1994), we define 
Dj(t)  as a vector of time-varying indicator variables.  For example, Dj(3)  is  1 in  the third year 
an  LBO  is  private,  and  0  during  all  other  years.  This  nonparametric  specification  may  be 
interpreted  as  a  piecewise  approximation  to  the  underlying  continuous  baseline hazard,  and 
allows for monotonic or non monotonic time dependence in the reversal rate, which is  modeled 
as: 
(5) 
In (5), "-0 is the baseline hazard; i.e., the reversal rate in the first post-buyout period for the base 
group of firms  for  which all elements of Xt(t)  are O.  The explanatory variables Xj(t)  may be 
fixed or time-varying.  The coefficient vector (3 reflects the effects of the explanatory variables, 
and the vector C measures the impact of the passage of time on the reversal probability starting 
with the second period.  The hazard function in (5) is subsequently transformed to the survivor 
function  as  described  in  footnote  4.  When  substituted  into  equation  (4),  the  conditional 
likelihood  contribution  Li(~ I "-0)  is  obtained.  We  term  Li(~ I  "-0)  "conditional"  because  it 
depends on a specific value of "-0. 
The specification thus far still may not account fully for the heterogeneity in the reversa! 
rate.  Kaplan (1991, p. 298) notes that explicit control for unobserved heterogeneity is necessary 
to avoid incorrect inferences as  to the true time-dependency of the reversal probability, but his 
method does not take such heterogeneity into account.  For example,  suppose every LBO firm 
4Si(t) may be written as  exp(-Om), where Oi(t)  is  the integral of ~(t) from 0 to  t.  See Ross (1980). 11 
has a constant reversal probability over time, but some firms' probabilities are high and  some 
are low.  In such a case the LBOs with high reversal probabilities wi11likely reverse after a few 
periods, leaving a higher proportion of LBO firms with low reversal probabilities.  Thus, fewer 
reversals  will  be  observed  as  time  passes  giving  the  incorrect  impression  that  reversal 
by allowing the baseline hazard Aa to vary across firms according to a certain distribution.  Their 
approach is  to  weight the conditional likelihood by  the  relative occurrence of its  Ao  value by 
means of a mixing distribution g(Aa).  Thus the unconditional likelihood becomes 
(6) 
The resulting  expression  for  Lj(t;)  in  (6)  will account  for  firm-specific  characteristics 
Xi(t) ,  the  passage  of time  Di(t) ,  and  unobserved  heterogeneity  in  the  baseline reversal  rate 
through g(Ao).  Using the gamma distribution as  the mixing distribution, it can be shown that 
the log-likelihood function for N firms is 
(7) 
B(  1)  (l _d,o)e{Jx,(I)+CD,(I) 
i  ti - + 
5Ignoring  unobserved heterogeneity introduces bias  in the estimation of C  in equation (5),  and also  renders 
estimates of fJ  biased and inconsistent.  See Heckman and Singer (1984a,  1984b), and Lancaster (1990). 12 
'i 
where  OJ  = P(Aj = 1), Bj(tJ  =  E exp[j3XlJ)  +  cDiV)], and a and r are the location and shape 
}=l 
parameters,  respectively,  of the  gamma distribution.  The mean  of the  gamma distribution  is 
given  by  E(Ao)  =  rIa.  The  coefficient  estimates  of the  (3  and  C  vectors  should  then  be 
interpreted relative to rIa. 
If  we assume that every LBO finn has the same probability of eventu::l1  reversal, peA.;  = 
1),  then  OJ  =  0 in (7), and the operation is  simplified.  However, it seems more plausible that 
the eventual reversal probability will vary across firms based on a set of firm characteristics X;, 
such that 
(8) 
We use a logit specification to  model  OJ  as follows: 
1  0i  =  0  (X)  = ----:-: 
1  +  eaX, 
(9) 
Thus the full split hazard model allows us to estimate the effect of explanatory variables X; on 
the probability of eventual reversal (through ex in (9)), or the effect of ~  on the timing (through 
(3  in  (7)). 
In the case where peA;  =  1)  =  0,  constant across firms,  0 represents the proportion of 
LBO firms that are temporary; i.e., that eventually will reverse.  In the case where 0 =  1,  we 
see  that  the  split  hazard  model  collapses  to  the  standard  hazard  model  where  all  firms  are 
expected to reverse eventually.  Even though 0 may be the same for all firms, duration is then 
still allowed to vary across firms due to differential effects of {3~. 13 
B.  Estimation Results 
In Table 3,  we present results of maximizing the log-likelihood function  (7) for  the full 
sample of 343 observations.  Because  156 of these are divisional,  the  model is  estimated first 
without CAR values. 
[Insert Table 3] 
The parameters estimated in Table 3 include ria,  the coefficient for FULL (= 1 if full 
firm, 0 if divisional), MBO (= 1 if management participation, 0 otherwise), the coefficient for 
SIZE (transaction dollar value/lOO million), and the vector C.  The latter contains (C2, ••• ,C7), 
where C2 corresponds to  year 2 (13-24 months), C3 corresponds to year 3 (25-36 months), and 
so  on.  In  Table 3,  we  present  results  in column  (1)  for  the case  of homogeneous  reversal 
probability  (0),  and  in  column  (2)  we  report parameter estimates  for heterogeneous  reversal 
probability (o(XJ). 
For the homogeneous eventual reversal probability case (column (1», the estimated mean 
reversal probability for the base year is 6.1 %;  i.e., the reversal probability in the first year for 
divisional  buyouts  (FULL = 0)  without  management  participation  (MBO  = 0).  The  C-
coefficients are interpreted relative to the first post-buyout year, thus each C-coefficient reflects 
a proportional shift in the conditional reversal rate relative to  the first post-buyout year.  For 
example,  C3  is  estimated at  .589.  For a non-MBO  observation  (MBO  =  0),  for  a division 
(FULL = 0),  the probability of reversal  in  year 3 is  .061  x exp(.589)  =  .11.  Then,  C4  = 
1.176,  hence the  reversal  probability  for  such  a firm  in  year 4 is  .061  x exp(l.l76)  =  .20, 
indicating  an  economically  meaningful  shift  in  the  fourth  year.  We  reject  the  joint  null 14 
hypothesis,  C2  = C3  = ...  = C7  = 0,  at  the  .01  level based on  the approximate x: criterion, 
thus  there is  evidence of significant time dependence. 6  All  individual C-coefficient estimates 
except C2 are significantly different from  zero  at the  .05 level.  Thus, as  the number of years 
since the buyout increases, the conditional reversal probability remains positive and exceeds that 
for  the  first  year.  We also  find  that  the  estimates  of (C4,  ••• ,  C7)  exceed  those of (~, C3) 
significantly,  thus the conditional reversal probability increases from  years  1-3  to  years 4-l3. 
After the fourth  year following  the buyout,  the conditional reversal probability levels off (we 
cannot reject C4  = Cs = C6  = C7), but is still positive and significantly greater than in the first 
3 years.  In Figure 1, we depict the conditional probability of reversal for years 1 through 7 for 
the  case  where  MBO  =  FULL  =  0.  The  heavy  line  is  a  smoothed  approximation  of the 
estimated  (discrete)  function. 7  This  illustrates  the  sharp  increase  in  reversal  probability  in 
year 4. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Given  the  homogeneity  assumption,  we  conclude  that  some  buyouts  are expected  to 
reverse later than others; i.e., MBOs are expected to  reverse less  quickly (coefficient estimate 
= -.334, significant at the .10 level based on  the likelihood ratio test).  We show in Figure 1 
the  conditional  reversal  probability  for  a  divisional  MBO  (MBO  =  1,  FULL  = 0).  The 
probability function (light line) lies everywhere below that for MBO  =  0, and does not rise as 
sharply by the end of year 4.  This illustrates that MBOs tend to reverse less quickly than non-
6See Judge et aI.  (1988), p.  105. 
1'fhe discrete function is smoothed by cubic spline interpolation. 15 
MBOs,  and  this  is  consistent  with  the  argument  by  Kaplan  (1991)  based  on  asymmetric 
information. 
The model reveals a negative but insignificant estimate for the effect of FULL on reversal 
probability.  Thus, we cannot conclude that full-firm LBOs tend to reverse more quickly than 
divisional LBOs (coefficient estimate  =  -.187, not significant at the .15 level).  The effect of 
transaction SIZE is  positive but insignificant at the .15 level.  Maximization of (7) under the 
assumption of homogeneous 0 allows us to estimate that parameter.  The point estimate is .882 
and we cannot reject 0 = 1 at the .15 level. 
Thus far,  based on the results in Table 3, column (1), we may conclude that significant 
positive time-dependency exists, and that MBOs are expected to reverse earlier than other LBOs. 
In  column  (2)  of Table 3,  we  allow  for  heterogeneity  in  5;  i.e.,  c\  =  5(xJ as  in  (9).  The 
explanatory variables SIZE, FULL and MBO now enter the model through the logit specification 
in  (9),  and given  the functional  form  the signs of coefficients have opposite interpretations. 
Again we note significant positive time-dependency; i.e., the elements of C are nonzero jointly 
and individually except for C2•  Thus, conditional reversal probability increases with passage of 
time since the LBO,  and  the patterns and  magnitudes of the C-coefficient estimates are quite 
similar  to  those  in  column  (1).  As  in  the  case  of homogeneous  0,  we  continue  to  find 
insignificant effects of FULL and SIZE, but the probability of eventual reversal is significantly ---
smaller for MBOs (coefficient estimate = 15.586, significant at the .05 level). 
Thus  far  we  have  seen  that  management participation has  a significant impact on  the 
timing  of the  reversal  and on  the probability of eventual reversal,  thus it appears that not all 
LBOs have the same eventual reversal probability (0),  even though the average 0 may be high. 16 
In Table 4, we present model estimates for 160 full-firm LBOs, thus we are able to examine the 
effects  on  duration  and  eventual  reversal  probability  of  the  market's  reaction  to  LBO 
announcements.  The market's reaction is  measured as  the CAR for the period t  =  -5  to  t  = 
+5.  As before we find evidence of significant time dependency; i.e., coefficient estimates C2, 
C3,  C4,  and Cs are jointly significant at the 5 percent level.  Note that the C-coefficients are 
defined differently than in Table 3.  Due to the composition of the (smaller) sample of full-firm 
LBOs,  we  define  C2,  ••• ,  Cs commencing  after  the  third  year  since  the  LBO.  Assuming 
homogeneous probability  (5)  of eventual reversal  (column  (1),  Table 4),  we find  that MBO 
exerts a significant effect on duration; MBOs are again expected to reverse less  quickly.  But 
when  we allow  for  heterogeneous  eventual  reversal  probability,  we find  that  MBO  has  an 
insignificant  effect on this  probability;  i.e.,  MBOs  do  not  exhibit  lower eventual  reversal 
probabilities, but they tend to reverse less quickly. 
[Insert Table 4] 
The effect of the LBO announcement effect (CAR) on duration is significant at the 5 
percent level;  i.e.,  large positive reactions  portend  reversal  less  quickly.  Thus,  LBOs  that 
promise to be the most valuable reorganizations (high CARs) tend to remain private longer.  In 
column  (2)  of Table  4,  we  allow  for  heterogeneous  eventual  reversal  probability.  The-
probability of eventual reversal (5)  is significantly smaller for LBOs that produced high CAR 
values at announcement.  Thus, allowing for heterogeneous eventual reversal probability,  we 
may conclude that LBO announcements that are greeted most enthusiastically by the stock market 17 
are  also  those  that  tend  to  have  lower eventual  reversal  probabilities,  and  those  that tend  to 
reverse less quickly. 
IV.  SUMMARY AND  CONCLUSIONS 
We employ a large sample (343 observations) of LBOs that took place during the period 
1980-1992 to  investigate the duration of the LBOs  and  their probability of eventual reversal. 
Hazard rate methods are used because they allow for censored data;  i.e., some LBO  firms go 
bankrupt,  are taken over by privately held  firms,  or continue to  be private at the end of the 
observation period.  We employ a split hazard model that allows for the probability of eventual 
reversal to vary across firms; earlier work by Kaplan (1991) uses standard hazard rate methods 
which assume implicitly that all LBOs eventually reverse, hence the (homogeneous) probability 
of eventual  reversal  is  1.  In  addition,  we  employ  the  stock  price  reaction  to  the  LBO 
announcements as an explanatory variable. 
Our results reveal pronounced time dependence in the reversal rates; i.e., the conditional 
probability of reversal in period t + 1 depends positively on the length of time t that the firm 
has been private.  We find that MBOs tend to reverse less quickly in the short run and that they 
have lower eventual reversal probabilities, thus not all firms are expected to reverse eventually.--
We also find that those firms whose going-private announcements produced large positive stock 
price  reactions  tend  to  reverse  less  quickly,  and  their  eventual  reversal  probabilities  are 
significantly  lower  than  other firms.  These  findings  are evidently  new  and  may  help  us  to 
understand  more fully the economic motives and consequences of LBO  transactions. 18 
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Description of Sample of 343 LBOs, 1980-1992: 
Duration of Censored and Completed Observations, SIZE, 
Full/Divisional Buyouts and Management Participation (MBO) 
N 
A.  Duration 
Completed 
IPO  92 
Acquired  31 
Censored 
Private  166 
Bankrupt  42 
Acquired  12 
B.  Other Characteristics 





















187/343  = 54.5 % 




















Stock Price Reactions to LBO Announcements, 1980-1992: 
Cumulative Average Abnonnal Returns (CAAR), Test Statistics (Z), 
Percentage of Positive Cumulative Abnonnal Returns (CAR), and 
Significance Level for Rejection of Hypothesis of 
Equal Positive and Negative CARs 
Event Window  CAAR (%)  z  % Pos  P-Value 
Full Firm LBOs 
[-1,  + 1]  15.6  55.530  90  .0000 
[-3,  +3]  18.1  41.859  94  .0000 
[-5,  +5]  19.2  35.337  94  .0000 
[-10,  + 10]  20.2  26.610  92  .0000 
Parent Firms of Divisional LBOs 
[-1,  + 1]  2.1  4.599  57  .0731 
[-3,  +3]  3.3  5.177  63  .0034 
[-5,  +5]  2.5  3.382  56  .1066 
[-10,  + 10]  2.6  3.138  61  .0110 
22 Table 3 
Parameter Estimates of Split Hazard Model 
of Duration of 343  LBOs,  1980-1992 
23 
Explanatory variables are  FULL (=  1 if full-firm,  0  if division);  MBO (=  1 if MBO,  0  otherwise);  SIZE (in 
dollars/lOoo); and time (C2, ••• ,  C7). 
Parameter 
ria 
~  (13-24 mos.) 
C3 (25-36 mos.) 
C, (37-48 mos.) 
C5 (49-60 mos.) 
C6  (61-72 mos.) 




























**Significant at the  10%  level, based on likelihood ratio  tests. 


















~  (37-48 mos.) 
C3  (49-60 mos.) 
C4  (61-72 mos.) 






Parameter Estimates of Split Hazard Model of Duration 
of 160 Full-finn LBOs.  Explanatory variables are 
MBO (= 1 if MBO, 0 otherwise); CAR (announcement period 







0.041  0.037 
1.530***  1.578*** 
1.866***  1.973*** 
1.516***  1.681 *** 






Intercept  -2.686*** 
SIZE  -0.093 
MBO  0.826 
CAR  5.612*** 
N  160  160 
LL  -186.985  -187.108 
**Significant at the 10 % level, based on likelihood ratio tests. 








Estimated conditional probability of reversal of LBOs 
in jth year following LBO transaction, j  = 1,  2, ...  , 7. 
The heavy line represents non-MBO division buyouts, 
while the light line  Is  for MBOs. 
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25 DERIV  A  TION OF THE SPLIT HAZARD MODEL 
WITH GAMMA MIXING DISTRIBUTION 
From equation (4) in  the text, the conditional likelihood function for the i-th LBO is  equal to 
(A.l) 
Assuming that the explanatory variables remain constant within each period but are allowed to 
vary across periods, it can be shown that (Ross  1980): 
-AO  B· (t·)  e  ~  ~  I 
(A. 2) 
where 
ti  L  e [P  Xi (j)  +  C  Di (j) 1  •  (A. 3) 
j-1 
Hence, 




we  can write 
-A  B. (t  .-1)  -A  PXi(ti) +cDi(ti)  e  0  1  1  [l-e  oe  ]  ,  (A. 6) and equation (A.4) becomes 
[  }l.  }l.  -A.  B.(t.-l)]d. 
X  l-ui+ui e  0"  '. 
(A. 7) 
Noting that dj  can only  take the  value of zero or one,  the last term of equation (A.7)  can be 
written as 
[  }l.  }l.  -A.  B.(t.-ll]d.  }l.di  [}l.  -A.oB.(t.-l)]d.  (A.8)  l-ui+ui e  0''  '=l-Ui+  vie  11  '. 
The unconditional likelihood for the i-th LBO, which is obtained by weighing the corresponding 
conditional likelihood by the relative occurrence of its Ao-value,  is  equal to 
J  Li ( tilAo)  g(Ao) dAo 
o 
-A  B.(t·-l)  -A  PXi(ti) +cDi(ti)  l-d· 
c.e o "  (l-eO e  )], 
~ 
(A. 9) 
Multiplying out expression (A.9): 
2 f 
'B(t  1)  ,PXi,ti)+CDi,til  1d  d 
- [ {)  i e -"0  i  r  ( 1 - e -"0 e  ) ]  - i  {) i 1  g ().o)  dAo 
a 
(A.10) 
Recalling that dj  can only take the value of zero or one, the first term of equation (A. 10) can be 
written as: 
which is  equal to 









AO,r,a> 0,  (A.13) the first term of equation (A.12) becomes 
J  c')~-di  (l+di )  e-Ao  (l-di )  Bi(tr 1 ) 
a 
c')~-di  (l+di ) 
r (r) 
l-d·  ~ 
c')i  > (l+dJ a I  f 
r (r) 
a 






e-a  Ao  }.I-l  d}' 
a  a 
r (r) 
(A. 14) 
where r(r) is the gamma function.  The last expression was obtained by recognizing that 
e  ~  ~  ~  f 
-Ao[(l-d.)B.(t.-l)+a] 
o 
f  e -Ao [ (l-di ) Bi (trl)  +a] 
o 
=  r (I)  .  (A. 15) 
4 Using equation (A.5),  the second term of equation (A.12) can be written as 
J  O~-di e-Ao  (l-di ) Bi(ti ) g(}"a) d(}"a)  I 
a 
which, using the same algebraic manipulations as  above, is equal to 
Hence, the first term in equation (A. 10)  is  equal to 
l-d· 
0i '(l+di )  aT 
Jt l-di  T 
Vi  a 
Using a similar logic, the second term in equation (A.IO) can be shown to equal 
0i (l+di )  aT  o·a T 
1. 
Finally, the third term in equation (A. 10) can be written as 
a 
Noting that 
the expression for (A.20) becomes 
Oi!e-AOBi(t;-l)  (l+di )  g(}"a)  dAa 
a 









(A.22) Substituting the gamma mixing distribution for  g(~), the first part of equation (A.22) becomes 
a  r (r) 
a r  e -a Ao  A  r-l dA 
a  a 
r  00  e-Ao[Bi(ti-l)+al [B.(t.-l) +a]I 
O.(l+d.)  a  J  ~  ~ 
~  ~  r(r)  [B.(t.-l)+a]r  o  ~  ~ 
a  I  r (r) 
°i(l+di ) 
r(r)  [Bi(ti-l)+a]I 
0i(l+di )  [  a  ]r 
Bi{ti-l)+a 
and the second part of equation (A.22) becomes 
o iJ e-Ao  Bi (tr1) 
o 
(A.23) 
o iJ  e-Ao  [Bi  (trl)  +  (l-di )  e P Xi(ti)  + cDi(ti)  +  al 
o 
a  r  Ag-l  dAo  (A.24)  r (r) 
Combining equations (A.23) and (A.24), the new expression for (A.20) becomes: 
°i{l+dJa I 
[Bi (ti-l) +a] I 
Combining the three terms of the unconditional likelihood function (equations (A.18), (A. 19) and 
(A.25)), the log-likelihood function for N LBOs is  equal to 
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